Excerpt
Travelers Behaving Badly:
Behavioral Economics Offers Insights for
Improving Transportation
By Mark Solof
Driving in traffic, one is often hard-pressed to think of fellow
travelers as rational. They swerve across multiple lanes to make a
turn, race to get to the next red light, slow to ogle fender-benders
and engage in other roadway antics. Yet for the most part
transportation planners and policymakers treat drivers— as well as
transit riders and other travelers — as basically rational. Given the
right rules, signs and signals, it is assumed we will tend to make
reasoned and thoughtful choices about where and how we travel.
A growing body of research is concluding otherwise.
Researchers are finding that people's bad decisions and behavior
involving transportation, health, finances and many other areas of
life are often not aberrations. Time and time again, in similar
circumstances, people will make the same mistakes and bad choices.
"We all have irrational tendencies," Duke University
Professor of Behavioral Economics Dan Ariely said. "But these are
not random. It is not as if one person behaves irrationally one way
and another person behaves irrationally another way." Rather, as
Ariely sums it up in the title of his best-selling book, we are
Predictably Irrational.
The tendencies have their roots in brain circuitry created
by evolution. "Everything we do similarly, we do for a biological
reason," he said. Some transportation planners and engineers are
beginning to draw upon psychological experiments cataloguing these
patterns of behavior —as well as their own experience about real world
travel— to find creative ways to discourage roadway antics and other
bad travel choices and improve infrastructure design.
Their efforts are part of a wider movement by the new
academic discipline of behavioral economics, established in the early
1990s, which is exploring how to factor "the human factor"
into the computer models and decision processes used in financial
markets, the transportation sector and other fields. There are
tantalizing indications these efforts to understand and harness the
quirks of human nature can help speed progress towards improved
safety, energy efficiency, reduced carbon emissions and achievement of
other goals.
Experimental Insights
The experiments into human behavior use games and simplified decision
situations, many conducted with college students, to identify patterns
of behavior that are likely to mirror real life decision-making. One
set of experiments finds that we are irrationally optimistic about our
abilities in many situations. Asked to predict their grades in a class
at the beginning of the semester, students invariably overrate their
performance, with the class skewed towards high achievers. Similarly
most drivers in repeated studies rate their skills as better than
average (sometimes referred to as the "Lake Woebegone
Effect," after radio personality Garrison Keillor's
fictional hometown "where all the children are above
average").
This can plausibly account for much of the
risky and boneheaded behavior on roadways-for instance driving while
talking on a cell phone. Drivers think they can beat the odds. They
feel, "It's the other person's behavior that needs to
be controlled, not mine," Tom Vanderbilt noted in his bestselling
book Traffic. Much of
drivers' overconfidence stems from an "illusion of
control" Ariely said. "When we control something, we feel
the risk is lower, even when it is not, and this is especially strong
in driving."
Other experiments identify an irrational "loss aversion" we
all exhibit in many situations. Students given free mugs demanded
substantially more money to give them up than other students, who did
not get mugs, were willing to pay for them. That is, we tend to place
greater weight on avoiding losses than in realizing gains. There is
also the related "endowment effect"— we can be tenacious in
holding on to our possessions. These biases likely influence how
people drive in many circumstances. In stop-and-go traffic,
researchers find drivers inordinately focus on the progress of
adjacent lanes to see if they are losing out. They can be tempted to
change lanes even when the advantage gained is fleeting. Such
behavior, Vanderbilt suggests, can be risky, especially in heavy
traffic.
While this may not be the same phenomenon as the
loss aversion we experience with objects or money, according to
Ariely, "it is related and maybe we use similar brain mechanisms
to think about it." Research also suggests that loss aversion can
bias our choice of routes, modes and other travel options. We are much
more motivated to avoid choices that we perceive might cause losses
(in time or money) than we are to adopt choices that promise us
savings. Some advocates of congestion pricing have suggested that loss
aversion may also account for people's initial, knee-jerk
opposition to charging tolls on free roadways.
In his research, Ariely said, loss aversion "is very basic. We
don't find people this doesn't happen to." The
catalogue of "irrational" behaviors that afflict humans is
long and varied (see sidebar ).
Systematic Bias
The most far-reaching implications are in the field of
finance and economics. The "irrational exuberance" leading
up to the 2008 economic crisis—including herd mentality among
investors and overconfidence in
past trends and financial
instruments—provided behavioral economists with dramatic evidence
about how actual behavior often departs from the rational ideal.
The
crisis, they say, has underscored the need for public and private
officials to recognize the “bounded rationality” of individuals —that
is, the real world limits on the ability of individuals to rein in
emotions and avoid cognitive pitfalls that affect decision-making.
Ariely
said rational economics is still useful. "The problem is not so
much with economics," he said. "The problem is that for some
reason we have assumed that [standard] economics is 100 percent
accurate . . . and we went a step further and we created systems — the
legal system and the banking system — that assume it is 100 percent
accurate."
Overconfidence is pervasive in driving and
other areas of life. This graph shows how people perceived their
abilities on a logical reasoning test compared to their actual score.
Those with the least ability showed the greatest overconfidence. While
behavioral economics can offer many insights for correcting this
assumption, he said, it is not about to supplant standard economics.
"We will probably never have a single theory of human
decision-making or of behavioral economics because the brain uses
different mechanisms to deal with different problems," he said.
Ariely envisions the field becoming "an applied discipline"
that offers practical insights to policymakers and directions for
creating experiments to improve the effectiveness of existing
policies. The approach, he said, is to "acknowledge our
limitations… [and] don't assume we understand everything."
Nudges
How can behavioral insights be applied to change the choices wemake in
transportation and other areas? Clearly regulation and enforcement,
such as banning cell phone use while driving, must play a primary
role. But behavioral economists Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein
suggest that subtle interventions ("nudges") that operate at
the level of our automatic thinking can often work. Following the
publication of their 2008 bestselling book
Nudge, the authors launched a
blog (nudges.org) to gather and discuss ideas from readers from around
the world.world.
The book and blog "sparked a lot of
interest among people who make public policy," according to John
Barz, Nudge Blog editor and research assistant to the authors at the
University of Chicago. "There also has been interest on the
private sector side, particularly with large organizations trying to
figure out how to help their employees get things done." One
category of nudges relates to people's "status quo"
bias, that is, our reluctance to change our current circumstances or
even take the time to ponder better alternatives. We're all lazy
deciders. Balz said people often use a "yeah, whatever"
decision-making approach: "[They think] 'I was doing this
before. Sure. Yeah, whatever. I'll keep doing it.'"
The default options we’re presented therefore become a
powerful force. One nudge blog reader reported that at the company
Novo Nordisk, fuel-efficient vehicles were made the default option for
sales people. Those who wanted an SUV or minivan could still get one,
but they needed approval from a supervisor. Minivan orders dropped
from 300-350 per year to 25.
In the field of
transportation, the "choice architecture" affecting
decisions includes the environment through which people travel,
providing a potential focus for nudges to change behavior. For
example, to calm traffic entering business or residential districts,
many towns use physical changes like narrowed lanes or speed bumps.
But nudges involving "psychological traffic-calming" can
also work, according to Erel Avineri, reader in travel behavior at the
Centre for Transport & Society, University of the West of England.
"Rather than humps and bumps and penalties . . . all kinds of
changes to the environment-changes to the pavement, to the road
surface texture, to street furniture-make it clear to drivers that
they are entering a different zone where different rules apply,"
he said.
In Avineri's town of Bristol, a gatehouse
acts as calming nudge for those entering the town center. Some cities
have tried transforming the humps and bumps into less intrusive
nudges. In Philadelphia, high- tech 3-D decals that create the
illusion of speed bumps were installed on the road surface at 100
intersections. On one residential street, average speeds dropped 13
mph after a month. A smaller reduction of 4 mph was found in a
previous test in Phoenix. Of course, locals may learn to ignore the
illusion over time, but the decals can still serve as a symbolic
reminder to slow down.
A perceptional nudge was also used
to slow traffic approaching a dangerous curve along Chicago's
Lake Shore Drive in 2006. According to nudge.com, "the city
painted a series of white lines perpendicular to traveling cars. The
lines get progressively narrower as drivers approach the sharpest
point of the curve, giving them the illusion of speeding up, and
nudging them to tap their brakes." Crashes went down 36 percent
in the six months following the intervention, compared to the previous
six months.